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This study provides new evidence regarding the linkage between the enforcement of IPR and trade 
flows in ASEAN countries. Based on the analysis of a gravity model and using the categorized panel 
data, the study finds robust empirical results. First, reinforced IPR protection in the importing 
countries (non-ASEAN countries) has a positive impact on ASEAN’s exports, indicating the prevalence 
of the market expansion effect. Stronger effects are found in the high-tech sectors such as chemicals, 
machinery and transport equipment. Second, increased IPR protection in the importing countries 
(ASEAN) has a negative effect on ASEAN’s imports, exhibiting the dominance of the market power 
effect. Stronger effects are found in the manufactured goods, beverage and tobacco industries. Third, 
since the coefficient on the IPR index is positive and statistically insignificant, we conclude that 
stronger protection of IPRs in both the ROW and ASEAN leads to an ambiguous increase in bilateral 
trade between ASEAN and the ROW. This is because of the fact that the increase in ASEAN’s exports 
due to stronger IPR protection in the ROW is partly cancelled out by the decrease in ASEAN’s imports 
as the result of stronger IPR protection in ASEAN.  
 





Economists have recognized that the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) has 
a significant impact on trade flows. The preliminary conjecture is that weak IPR protection 
distorts natural trade patterns and the ability of firms to transfer technology abroad. Thus, 
differences in national norms regarding IPR protection are thought to negatively affect freer 
flows of international trade. This could be one of the reasons why the regulation of national 
regimes of intellectual property rights has recently become a contentious issue. Indeed, 
disputes over IPR during the 1980s led to numerous initiatives to harmonize and strengthen 
IPRs at national and international levels. The resulting Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994 represents the most far-reaching multilateral 
agreement toward global harmonization of IPR.  
The results of the Uruguay Round were, however, extremely controversial for many 
WTO member countries.
1
 From the developed countries’ point of view, lack of IPR 
protection in developing countries constitutes an unfavorable trade environment that could 
reduce their firms’ competitive positions. Thus, they called for multilateral rules and 
enforcement of IPR. On the other hand, many developing countries strongly opposed this, 
                                                          

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1 As explained in Hoekman and Kostecki (2001: 274-299), an intellectual property system seeks to 
create a balance between the need for a temporary monopoly to create incentives for innovation and 
the benefits of free access knowledge. 
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arguing that non-protection of IPRs on their part had a negligible impact on producers in 
OECD countries, and that adoption of stronger IPRs would increase the profitability of 
foreign firms at the expense of domestic producers and thus would be detrimental to their 
welfare and development prospects (Hoekman & Kostecki 2001: 274-299).  
Theoretically, economic analysis is unable to predict the direction of the impacts of IPR 
protection on bilateral trade flows.
1
 The existence of this ambiguity is due to the fact that, in 
a market initially served by foreign and infringement products,
2
 the strengthening of IPRs 
would create two effects working in opposite directions (see, e.g., Schwartz 1991: 231-246; 
Taylor, 1993: 625-638; Taylor, 1994:361, 382, 638; Maskus & Penubarti 1995: 227-248; 
Smith, 1999: 151-177). On the one hand, the protection of IPRs in the importing country 
grants monopoly power to the exporting country. So the imports may decrease if exporters 
exercise their enhanced market power by reducing output and charging higher prices to 
segments of their foreign markets. On the other hand, greater protection of IPRs in the 
importing country might expand imports because stronger IPR protection deters local 
imitation and increases the net demand for the protected products. Since these two effects are 
offsetting, no clear prediction can be made regarding the direction of the impact of IPR 
protection on trade. 
This theoretical ambiguity regarding the impact of IPR protection on international trade 
has, nonetheless, led to several empirical attempts. Recently, a growing body of literature on 
the nature and direction of the effects of IPR protection on international trade flows 
suggested that the relationship between IPRs and trade cannot be generalized (see Maskus & 
Penubarti 1995: 227-248; Frink & Primo-Braga, 2005; Jung 2007: 231-258; Kang and Park 
2006: 5-31; Smith 1999: 151-177; Rafiquzzaman 2002: 307-330; Smith 2002: 495-512; Oh 
and Won 2005: 19-42). However, the remaining theoretical ambiguity coupled with mixed 
empirical results regarding the impact of IPR protection on trade flows suggest that the 
impact of stronger IPR on international trade is an empirical issue. This has induced us to 
concentrate on the empirical analysis of the issue on the ASEAN case. The objective of this 
research is to analyze the impact of IPR protection on trade flows in ASEAN countries. It is 
guided by the following research questions: 
 
• Does stronger protection of IPRs affect ASEAN’s exports and imports? 
• How does IPR protection affect the trade flows of individual industries differently? 
• Which policy implications can be derived from the study? 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper differs from the previous studies in several respects. First, 
this study provides new evidence regarding the linkage between IPRs and trade with a focus 
                                                          
1 Maskus (2000: 113) noted that theoretical models do not clearly predict the impacts of variable patent 
rights on trade volumes. Much depends on local market demand, the efficiency of imitative 
production, and the structure of trade barriers. Also important are the reactions of imperfectly 
competitive firms. Thus, a clear picture can emerge only from empirical studies.  
2 Once the product has been imitated, unauthorized copies of this product do not necessarily need to 
exhaust the entire domestic market immediately because imitators might face several limitations (such 
as financial constraints, lack of labor force, poor distributional networks, etc.). Additionally, even in a 
weak IPR system, the enforcement levels might be able to deter piracy in some segments of the 
market. Accordingly, it makes sense to conceive an initial equilibrium with a foreign firm and 
domestic competitive fringe.    





on ASEAN countries. Little evidence has ever been documented on the experiences of 
ASEAN countries and in that sense, this study would provide important insights into 
ASEAN countries where level of economic development and imitation capacity differs 
across the members. Second, the study is based on the analysis of more recent panel data 
which allow the patent regime to change over time. Third, the impact of IPR is firstly forced 
to be uniform across sectors and then is allowed to differ across sectors so that industry-
specific evidences can be documented. Finally, to measure the status of an IPR regime, the 





2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Although it is unambiguous that IPR protection can influence trade flows, the net impact 
on trade flows from strengthening the protection of IPRs remains theoretically ambiguous 
(Maskus, 2000; Maskus & Penubarti 1995: 227-248). Stronger protection of IPRs in 
importing countries allows the foreign exporters to behave more monopolistically and to 
choose to serve the exporting market by foreign direct investment or by licensing its 
intellectual asset to a foreign firm (Ferrantino 1993: 300-331; Lee & Mansfield 1996: 181-
186; Maskus 1998: 186-208; Seyoum 1996: 50-59), which is known as the market power 
effect. Simultaneously, a stronger level of IPR protection in importing countries encourages 
the foreign exporters to export more to the foreign market due to the shrinkage of imitative 
activities in importing countries, which is known as the market expansion effect.  
The link between IPRs and trade can not be answered by theoretical argument alone.  
Empirically, a number of studies have attempted to estimate the effects of IPR protection 
(e.g., Al-Mawali 2005: 823-828; Wen-Hsien & Ya-Chi 2005: 1543-1555). Kang and Park 
(2006: 5-31) used gravity model to analyze the impacts of foreign IPRs level on the export of 
Korea from 2001 to 2003 divided by trading partners and industries. They found that foreign 
IPRs level has negative effects on Korea’s total exports. However, the effects of IPRs are 
found to be negative in the export to developing countries and low-tech industries exports, 
but positive in the high-tech industries export to developed countries. Using 1984 data, 
Maskus and Penubarti (1995: 227-248) found that a stronger protection of IPRs increases 
trade flows  that is the market expansion effect tends to dominate the market power effect 
 when all industries are pooled. Jung (2007: 231-258) also found that foreign protection of 
IPRs have the market expansion effects on total IT exports of Korea. This result is confirmed 
by Oh and Won (2005: 19-42), who found similar results  that is, Korea tends to export 
more to the trading partners where their patents are highly protected. Primo-Braga and Frink 
(1997) used a similar model and produced the same results.
2
 Ferrantino (1993: 300-331) 
studied the effect of IPR regimes on exports. Using the US export data, he found that 
importing countries’ patent regimes do not affect total exports. Smith (1999: 151-177) 
qualified these results by showing that the market expansion effect of IPRs depends on 
whether local firms are capable of imitating the exporter’s technology. The study indicated 
that US exports are sensitive to patent rights in importing countries, and the direction of the 
                                                          
1 Rapp and Rozek (1990: 75-102) also developed the IPR index. However, the IPR index developed by 
Park and Ginarte is the most appropriate in the present context because it has the broadest country 
coverage. Moreover, it allows for a much more fine-tuned ranking of national IPR system.  
2 They found that there was a positive link between patent protection and trade flows.  
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relationship rests with the threat of imitation.
1
 Rafiquzzaman (2002: 307-330) found that the 
effect of stronger patent rights is seen to increase exports to those countries that pose a strong 
threat of imitation and to reduce exports to countries that pose weakest threat of imitation. 
This result is also confirmed by Smith (2002: 495-512), who showed that stronger foreign 
patent rights stimulate the market expansion of US drug exports across countries with strong 
imitative abilities, but enhance the marker power of US drug exporters across countries with 
weak imitative abilities. More recently, Frink and Primo-Braga (2005: 19-40) found a 
positive link between IPRs and trade flows for total non-fuel trade, but a weak link between 
IPRs and high technology trade.
2
 
A review of the previous literature on the subject leads to the following conclusion. 
Theoretically, there is a link between IPRs and trade flow  more specifically, IPRs do 
affect trade. However, the direction of the impact is ambiguous, depending on the interaction 
between market expansion and market power effects. Empirically, evidence on the linkage 
was mixed, suggesting that the impact of IPR protection on trade flows can only be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis. However, past empirical evidence showed that industrial countries 
with relatively weak IPR regimes tended to experience an increase in bilateral trade (bilateral 
imports).
3
 In contrast, in underdeveloped and developing countries with weak patent rights 







3.1. Analytical model 
 
The topic being explored is most suited to a quantitative approach. In seeking to 
empirically estimate the impacts of increased IPR protection on international trade flows, a 
gravity model is adopted. The gravity model is commonly applied in the international trade 
literature to analyze trade distortions associated with policy differences across countries. The 
specification takes various forms that include both exporter and importer characteristics and 




lnTijt= α + β1lnGDPit + β2lnGDPjt + β3lnPOPit + β4lnPOPjt + β5lnDISTij + β6BORDij + β7EX-
COLONYij + β8LANGij + β9IPRj + eij   
                                                          
1 The threat of imitation may be viewed as a reflection of an importing country’s ability to imitate 
technologies embodied in the imported goods.  
2 The authors’ possible explanations are that the market power effect of IPRs could very well dominate 
in high-technology sectors, that stronger IPRs lead to a switch from exporting to FDI, or that 
technology exports depend on alternative means of appropriation (such as first-mover advantages or 
reputation).  
3 Industrial countries have strong imitation abilities. So to a large extent, their markets might be served 
by imitated goods. Stronger IPR regimes would reduce the level of local infringement, and imitated 
goods are replaced by foreign patented goods, generating a market expansion effect.    
4 Initially, markets of these countries might already be served by foreign exporting firms. Since the 
imitation abilities in these countries are often weak, the strengthening of IPR regime in these countries 
would not create the market expansion effect large enough to outweigh the market power effect.    
5 We adopt Glick and Rose (2002: 1125-1151) for the empirical specifications.  





• Tijt is bilateral trade volume between country i and country j at the time t.  
• GDPit and GDPjt are the gross domestic products (GDP) of the country i and country j at 
the time t respectively.  
• POPit and POPjt are populations of country i and country j at the time t respectively.  
• DISTij is geographical distance, measured as the crow flies, between the capital cities of 
country i and the capital city of country j.  
• BORDij is a dummy variable that equals 1 if both country i and country j have a 
common border, and zero otherwise. 
• LANGij is a dummy variable that equals 1 if both country i and country j speak the same 
language, and zero otherwise. 
• EX-COLONY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if country i was ever colonized by 
country j or vice versa, and zero otherwise.  
• IPRj is the IPR index of the importing country 
• eij is an error term.  
 
The gravity theory predicts that parameters on GPD are positive (Anderson 1979: 106-
116). The coefficients on populations could be positive or negative depending on whether the 
economies of scale effect or the absorption effect is dominant (Brada & Mendez 1983: 589-
603; Endoh 1999: 207-216; Endoh 2000: 571-589; Linnemann, 1966; Oguledo & Macphee 
1994: 107-120). Distance between trading partners is used as a proxy for several distance-
related variables such transport costs, cultural differences, and access to relevant market 
information. Therefore, I expect that the sign of this variable is negative. Since a commonly 
shared border, linguistic affinity and ex-colony status tend to reduce overall cultural distance 
and encourage bilateral trade, it is expected that the coefficients for these three dummy 
variables are positive.  
In line with the existing literature, IPR has an indeterminate effect on bilateral trade, and 
thus the impact of IPRs is an empirical issue. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of the IPR 
index could be positive (reflecting the dominance of market expansion effect) or negative 
(reflecting the dominance of market power effect).  
 
3.2. Model  Specification 
 
First, the regression equation with respect to total bilateral trade between ASEAN and the 
Rest of the World (ROW) is estimated. This means that, by pooling the panel data on exports 
and imports together, we force the impact of IPRs on ASEAN’s exports and imports to be 
uniform. Second, the regression model with respect to ASEAN’s exports to ROW (classified 
by ASEAN’s total exports and ASEAN’s exports by commodity) is estimated. Lastly, the 
regression model with respect to ASEAN’s imports from ROW (classified by ASEAN’s total 
imports and ASEAN’s imports by commodity) is estimated. After the regression equations 
for ASEAN’s exports and imports, respectively, are run and estimated, the impacts of IPR 
protection on exports and imports across industries are also examined.    
The rationale for setting up different specifications is as follows. First, using the data of 
total bilateral trade allows us to see the overall impact of IPRs on trade flows regardless of 
the direction of the trade. Second, using the data of ASEAN’s exports and imports separately 
enables us to compare the impact of IPR regimes on ASEAN’s exports with the case of 
ASEAN’s imports. Third, using the same gravity equation for different sectors allows us to 
capture the distinctive features of each sector in terms of IPR-sensitivity.   
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3.3. Data  
 
The data for 6 ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam) and 10 countries representing the Rest of the World (Australia, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, UK, and US) for 1990, 1995 and 2000 are 
used.
1
 These 6 ASEAN countries above are the major actors in ASEAN, whereas the rest of 
the 10 Non-ASEAN countries are the major trading partners of ASEAN.  
Data on bilateral trade flows (Tijt), as measured in millions US$ are from the IMF 
Direction of Trade Statistics. Data on bilateral commodity trade, as measured in US$, are 
obtained from UN Statistics Division  Commodity Trade Statistics Database. Data on GDP, 
as reported in US$ millions, and population, as reported in millions, are extracted from the 
IMF World Economic Outlook Database. Data on geographical distances between country i 
and country j (DISTij) are collected from Indo.com (http://www.indo.com/distance/). Data on 
common language and ex-colony come from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Finally, to 
capture the effect of IPRs on bilateral trade flows, we use the IPR index developed by Park 
and Ginarte (1997).
2
 Appendix 1 will summarize how the IPR index is calculated. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Results for pooled data 
 
The summary of statistics for the data used in the estimation is presented in Appendix 2. 
The basic results for specification 1 are shown in Table 1. The gravity model fits the data 
well, explaining a major part of the variation in bilateral trade. The conventional variables 
behave very much as the model predicts. All estimated coefficients, except for the IPR index, 
are statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. GDP turned out to be an important 
explanatory variable. GDPs of both exporting and importing countries register positive 
impacts on bilateral trade, and the impacts are highly significant. The coefficient on GDP 
indicates that one percent increase in the GDP of the exporting country increases the 
exporting country’s exports by 0.66 percent. The coefficient on the importing country’s GDP 
is also positive with elasticity of 0.67. 
The coefficients on population are negative and statistically significant.
3
 In the estimation, 
a one percent increase in the population of the exporting country reduces the exporting 
country’s exports by 0.14 percent, while an increase in the importing country’s population by 
one percent reduces the importing country’s imports by 0.22 percent.  
We also found the conventional negative sign on distance, and positive signs on common 
land border, common language and ex-common colonizer variables. The estimated 
coefficient on the log of bilateral distance is negative and statistically significant, implying 
that an increase in the log of bilateral distance by 1 percent leads to a 0.67 percent decline of 
                                                          
1 The data on IPR index is available up to the year 2000 obtained directly from professor Park. 
2 The latest available data on IPR index, developed by Park Walter G. and Juan C. Ginarte, at the time 
of writing is only up to 2000. 
3 This result is consistent with the prediction of Linneman (1966) and others as explained in the section 
3.1.  





bilateral trade. A common land border, a common language, and ex-common colonizer could 
raise bilateral trade by 20.4, 17.8 and 9.9 percent respectively.   
 
Table 1. Regression Result for Pooled Data 
Explanatory Variables βs t-statistic 
Constant -1.0871** -5.204 
LnGDPit (Exporting country’s GDP) 0.6652** 28.409 
LnGDPjt (Importing country’s GDP) 0.6749** 18.458 
LnPOPit (Exporting country’s POP) -0.1368** -4.528 
LnPOPjt (Importing country’s POP) -0.2237** -5.472 
LnDISTij  -0.6714** -17.042 
BORDij 0.1854** 2.417 
LANGij  0.1642** 4.622 
Ex-COLONYij 0.0942*0 2.090 
IPRj (Importing country’s IPR) 0.002500 0.114 
Number of observation 662 
Adjusted R2 0.742 
F-statistic 211.91 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Finally, our primary interest is in the impact of IPRs on bilateral trade. Unfortunately, the 
coefficient on the patent rights index of the importing country is positive but statistically 
insignificant. This is because the positive effects are partly canceled out by the negative 
effects when the data for exports and imports are pooled together. This finding is consistent 
with Frink & Primo-Braga (2005: 19-40). A further investigation into the magnitude of the 
IPR elasticities of trade flows can be assessed not with the pooled data but with export or 
import data separately. To some degree, section 4.2 and 4.3 will answer why the coefficient 
of the IPR index in this model is positive but statistically insignificant. 
 
4.2. Results for ASEAN’s Exports 
 
The estimated results for ASEAN’s exports are presented in Table 2. The first row shows 
the estimates of coefficients for all industries. All coefficients show the expected signs, 
although not all of them are statistically significant. The coefficient on patent rights index is 
positive and highly significant, indicating the dominance of the market expansion effect. 
This implies that, on average, stronger IPR regimes in the ASEAN’s trading partners will 
reduce the threat of imitation and induce greater ASEAN exports to these countries. So 
ASEAN countries tend to export more to those countries with relatively strong protection of 
IPRs. This result is consistent with that of Maskus & Penubarti (1997: 95-118), 
Rafiquzzaman (2002: 307-330), and Smith (1999: 151-177).  
When assessing the impacts of IPRs on individual sectors, it is clear that the above effects 
vary across sectors. GDP of the exporting countries (ASEAN in this case) continues to be the 
important explanatory variable. The coefficient on GDP of importing countries is negative 
and statistically significant for the chemical sector. Since the chemical sector belongs to the 
high-tech industry, this implies that, in general, countries with higher GDPs tend to produce 
more of chemical products as their production capacity increases. The effects of distance 
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between countries are uniformly negative across all sectors. Although this coefficient is not 
statistically significant in some sectors, it implies that longer distance reduces trade.  
On the supply side, countries with higher GDPs tend to have production capacity 
expanded, and invest more in R&D, especially in the high-tech sectors. Note that the GDPs 
in this case are GDPs of ROW. Most of the countries selected to represent ROW have high 
GDPs and high GDP per capita (except China and Korea). The ranking of these countries in 
terms of GDPs are as follows: USA, Japan, Germany, China, UK, France, Canada, Korea, 
Australia, and Netherlands (WEO, 2007). The ranking of countries in terms of GDP per 
capita are almost the same, except China and Korea. 
When the impacts of IPR protection are allowed to differ across sectors, we observe that, 
although all coefficients are positive across all sectors, not all coefficients are statistically 
significant (the coefficients are statistically significant only in such sectors as chemicals, 
manufactured goods, and machinery and transport equipment). In addition, stronger effects 
of IPRs are found in high-tech sectors such as chemicals, transport equipment and machinery. 
This finding supports the view that, in these industries, the strengthening of patent rights 
does enhance trade through market expansion. In other industries, such as food and beverage 




Table 2: Regression Result for ASEAN’s Exports 
Industry 
Baseline Patent Rights 

































































































































































** Significant at the 0.01 level  









Table 3: Regression Result for ASEAN’s Imports 
Industry 
Baseline Patent Rights 

































































































































































** Significant at the 0.01 level  
*Significant at the 0.05 level 
 
 
4.3. Results for ASEAN’s Imports 
 
The regression results for ASEAN’s imports are presented in table 3. The first row shows 
the estimates for all industries. The coefficient on patent rights index is negative and highly 
significant, indicating the dominance of the market power effect. This implies that, on 
average, the strengthening of IPR protection in the importing countries (ASEAN) does 
reduce ASEAN’s imports. So ASEAN countries tend to import less as their IPR protection 
becomes stronger. This is consistent with the fact that most ASEAN countries are developing 
countries with weak imitation capacities. The market expansion effect is not sufficiently 
strong, since a large share of these markets might be already served by foreign providers. 
Therefore, as the market power effect outweighs the market expansion effect, the net effect 
on imports is negative. The coefficients for the other variables exhibit the expected signs, 
although not all of them are statistically significant. 
Again it is clear that the above effects vary across sectors. The coefficients on GDP of 
exporting countries (for food sector) and importing countries (for beverage and tobacco) is 
negative but not statistically significant. For other sectors, the coefficients on GDP are 
positive and statistically significant, implying that GDP continues to be an important 
determinant of trade. Specifically, an increase in GDP of the importing countries and/or the 
exporting countries would increase trade.  
Finally, our interest focuses on the coefficient for the IPR index across sectors where the 
coefficients are negative for all sectors. As shown in table 3, the coefficients on beverage and 
tobacco, and manufactured goods are statistically significant. Although the coefficients on 
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the IPR index for chemicals and machinery and transport equipment are not statistically 
significant, it could be implied that ASEAN countries, on average, have low imitation 
capacities. So, the market power effect dominates in the case of ASEAN’s imports.    
These results are consistent with empirical evidence that countries with relatively 
sufficient levels of industrialization (good imitation abilities) normally experience a positive 
effect of IPRs on imports – that is, market expansion effects. In contrast, for developing 
countries with low levels of industrialization and weak imitation abilities, the net trade 




This paper analyzes the impacts of IPR protection on trade flows with a focus on ASEAN 
countries. Our empirical results are robust. Major findings are summarized as follows: 
First, since the coefficient on the IPR index is positive and statistically insignificant in the 
case of total bilateral trade, we conclude that stronger protection of IPRs in the ROW and 
ASEAN at the same time leads to an ambiguous increase in bilateral trade between ASEAN 
and the ROW. This is because the increase in ASEAN’s exports due to stronger IPR 
protection in the ROW is partly cancelled out by the decrease in ASEAN’s imports as the 
result of stronger IPR protection in ASEAN. Thus, positive effect and negative effect offset 
each other, resulting in positive and statistically insignificant coefficient for IPR index.   
Second, stronger protection of IPRs in the ROW is an important determinant of 
ASEAN’s exports to the ROW. Since the coefficient on IPR index of the ROW is positive 
and statistically significant, we argue that the reinforced IPR protection in the importing 
countries (the ROW) has a positive impact on ASEAN’s exports to the ROW, indicating the 
prevalence of the market expansion effect. When the impacts of IPR protection are allowed 
to differ across sectors, stronger effects are found in the high-tech sectors such as chemicals, 
machinery and transport equipment.  
Third, stronger protection of IPRs in ASEAN is an important explanation for ASEAN’s 
imports from the ROW. Unlike the impact of IPR protection on ASEAN’s exports, the 
enforcement of IPR protection on the importing countries (ASEAN) has a negative effect on 
ASEAN’s imports, exhibiting the dominance of the market power effect. When the impacts 
of IPRs on ASEAN’s imports are allowed to differ across sectors, the coefficients are 
negative for all sectors and stronger effects are found in the manufactured goods, beverage 
and tobacco industries. 
Industrial countries with relatively weak IPR systems and strong imitative abilities should 
experience an increase in bilateral imports when their IPR systems are strengthened. In 
contrast, in developing countries with weak patent rights and weak imitative capabilities, the 
effects of reinforced IPR regimes on their imports could be negative or ambiguous. Since 
many of the ASEAN members are low-income countries, it is expected that stronger IPR 
regimes in these countries will generate negative and, at most, ambiguous effects on its 
imports.  
The implication is that a stronger patent regime should be accompanied by efforts to 
increase research intensity in ASEAN countries in order to offset the market power effect. As 
the result indicates, stronger protection of IPRs in the rest of the world would increase 
ASEAN’s exports to the rest of the world. This result is consistent with the findings of Co 
(2004: 359-373) that in markets where potential competitors can arise (imitative ability is 
above certain critical level), exports of IPR-intensive goods increase with stronger patent 





regimes. Weak IPR protection in the rest of the world is the barrier to ASEAN’s exports (the 
effects are stronger in chemicals and transport equipment and machinery). In addition, most 
of ASEAN countries are those which should expect a large adjustment in domestic output 
and labor as fringing production activities in the rest of the world are replaced progressively 
by ASEAN exports. GDP, distance and language are important determinants of ASEAN’s 
exports. The implication is that, in order to further accelerate ASEAN’s exports, stronger 
protection of IPR in the rest of the world should be accompanied by higher GDP, improved 
land infrastructure, and foreign language ability in ASEAN countries. The finding also 
implies that the policy debate should not focus on whether or not stronger protection of IPR 
leads to the market power effect or the market expansion effect, but on where stronger 
protection of IPR confer the market power or expansion effects (on the basis of imitative 
capacity and research intensity). This debate is particularly relevant in high-tech sectors. 
Finally, some ASEAN countries are currently not members of the WTO. When IPR 
protection in these countries becomes stronger as they access the WTO, we would expect 
that the market power and market expansion effects would be large in magnitude.  
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APPENDIX 1: CONSTRUCTION OF IPR INDEX 
 
This index grades the national IPR regimes of 110 countries on a scale of zero to five. To 
compute a country’s ranking, Park and Ginarte created five categories, including 
membership in an international treaty, coverage, restriction on patent rights, enforcement and 
duration of protection. The following table refers to how the index of patent rights is 
constructed.  
 
Construction of Patent Right Index 
1. Membership in international treaty Signatory Not Signatory 
Paris Convention and Revisions 1/3 0 
Patent Cooperation Treaty 1/3 0 
Protection of New Plant Varieties 1/3 0 
2. Coverage Available Not Available 
Patentability of pharmaceuticals  1/7 0 
Patentability of chemicals 1/7 0 
Patentability of food 1/7 0 
Patentability of plant & animal varieties 1/7 0 
Patentability of surgical products 1/7 0 
Patentability of microorganism  1/7 0 
Patentability of utility model 1/7 0 
3. Restrictions on Patent Rights Does Not Exist Exists 
Working Requirements 1/3 0 
Compulsory Licensing 1/3 0 
Revocation of Patents 1/3 0 
4. Enforcement  Available Not Available 
Primary Injunctions  1/3 0 
Contributory Infringement  1/3 0 
Burden-Of-Proof Reversal  1/3 0 
5. Duration of Protection  Full Partial 
 1 0<f*<1 
* f equals the duration of protection as a fraction of the full (potential) duration. Full duration is 
either 20 years from the date of application or 17 years from the issuing date of the grant (for grant-
based patent system).   


















APPENDIX 2-A: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ASEAN’S TOTAL TRADE 
 
 LnYijt LnGDPit LnGDPjt LnPOPit LnPOPjt LnDISTij BORDij LANGij COLONYij IPRjt 
Count 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 662.0000 
Mean 3.3687 5.6205 5.6205 1.7388 1.7388 3.7477 0.0514 0.2205 0.1329 3.4788 
Sample 
variance 
0.5069 0.4781 0.4781 0.2898 0.2898 0.1769 0.0488 0.1722 0.1154 1.0851 
Standard 
deviation 
0.7120 0.6914 0.6914 0.5383 0.5383 0.4206 0.2209 0.4149 0.3398 1.0417 
Minimum 1.2499 3.8110 3.8110 0.4839 0.4839 2.4771 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 
Maximum 5.3814 6.9946 6.9946 3.1029 3.1029 4.2300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 5.0000 
Range 4.1314 3.1836 3.1836 2.6191 2.6191 1.7529 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 4.6667 
Source: Results from descriptive statistics  
 
APPENDIX 2-B: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ASEAN’S EXPORTS 
 
 LnEijt  LnGDPit  LnGDPjt  LnPOPit   LnPOPjt  LnDISTij  BORDij  LANGij  COLONYij  IPRROW 
Count 165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000   165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  
Mean 3.1257  4.8715  6.0566  1.5914  1.8261  3.9075  0.0121  0.2606  0.1818  3.9806  
Sample 
variance 
0.3181  0.0925  0.1966  0.3192  0.2559  0.0492  0.0120  0.1939  0.1497  0.5844  
Standard 
deviation 
0.5640  0.3042  0.4434  0.5650  0.5058  0.2217  0.1098  0.4403  0.3869  0.7645  
Minimum 1.2499  3.8110  5.4213  0.4839  1.1747  3.3657  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.2262  
Maximum 4.3782  5.3490  6.9946  2.3120  3.1029  4.2137  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  5.0000  
Range 3.1283  1.5380  1.5733  1.8282  1.9282  0.8480  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  3.7738  
Source: Results from descriptive statistics  
 
APPENDIX 2-C: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ASEAN’S IMPORTS 
 
 LnMijt  LnGDPit  LnGDPjt  LnPOPit   LnPOPjt  LnDISTij  BORDij  LANGij  COLONYij  IPRASEAN 
Count 165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  165.0000  
Mean 3.0878  6.0566  4.8715  1.8261  1.5914  3.9075  0.0121  0.2606  0.1818  2.6484  
Sample 
variance 0.3580  0.1966  0.0925  0.2559  0.3192  0.0492  0.0120  0.1939  0.1497  0.8238  
Standard 
deviation 0.5983  0.4434  0.3042  0.5058  0.5650  0.2217  0.1098  0.4403  0.3869  0.9077  
Minimum 1.3965  5.4213  3.8110  1.1747  0.4839  3.3657  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.3333  
Maximum 4.4201  6.9946  5.3490  3.1029  2.3120  4.2137  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  4.5238  
Range 3.0235  1.5733  1.5380  1.9282  1.8282  0.8480  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  4.1905  
Source: Results from descriptive statistics  
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